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Abstract.
Several analysts perceive a ‘great transformation’ of the structure of the production process and postulate
changes in the political regulation-system governing that process. Others claim that there’s nothing worth
mentioning about this rage, and posit the continuation of long known cyclical and secular trends. So, there
seems to be a general lack of common understanding and accurate definition in the academic and political
debate. Neither the concept of ‘globalisation’ nor that of ‘regionalisation’ seems to be an acceptable
‘description’ nor an ‘explanation’ of the structural transformations of the economy. Day by day, a larger
number of scientists is convinced of the fact that globalisation is, as an empirical phenomenon, an
overstatement. In this rather theoretical paper, I’ll expound the proposition that it could be useful to consider
globalisation as a myth with strategic consequences.
After all, globalisation is also a ‘potential process’ which can not easily be grasped by the standard procedures
of scientific research, based on the principles of positivism and going back to the Age of Reason. According to
the popular discours and belief, held in the face of ‘overwhelming contrary (empirical) evidence’, European
regions are involved in an intense worldwide competition. A competition with remote countries and with one
another. Each region is trying to attract new investments (away from others) and to preserve existing ones
(against others), so the story goes. But, this perception which is based on the exaggereation of spectacular
examples of globalisation, this general expectation of what tomorrow will bring, has indeed severe
consequences for present behaviour. This paper will try to substantiate and clarify this mechanism using
theoretical and rather abstract concepts and will try to formulate a possible way of approaching contemporarily
restructuring processes.
Furthermore and because of it, this era of ‘hypercompetition’ is also characterized by a transformation from the
Keynesian welfare state towards the post-Fordist Schumpeterian workfare state, a version of the ‘competition
state’-model. This transition has farreaching consequences for the neo-corporatist organisation of the European
economies and the underlying Fordist social consensus. Because of the delegation of important parts of the
socio-economical policy-domains towards the regional government, it is believed that these too are forced to
play the game of global competition. The discourse of globalisation, the ideology of competition, the modern
version of ‘beggar-they-neighbour’, the competitive provision of investment-incentives, the ‘pensée unique’
and actions inspired by it, these and other convictions are setting regions against each other because they are,
according to that general perception, in competion with each other.
It is a perception which could - unnecessarily - complicate a ‘regional understanding’, essential for the
construction of a ‘Europe of regions’. The protection of the regional interests at the EU level requires solidarity
and common understanding. In order to construct a suitable and adequate institutional apparatus at Union level,
regional actors must first clear their minds and dismiss the story of popular belief. This paper about the mental
construction of globalisation tries to enumerate some arguments on that matter.1. Introduction.
At the turn of the ‘long twentieth century’, there seems to be two fundamentally different principles
of organisation in the world order: one is essentially political and organizes the world’s population as
subjects of a series of formally distinct sovereign states, the other is essentially economic and organizes
the world’s population as participants in a single world production system (Hopkins and Wallerstein
1982). As with previous centennial celebrations, there is a lot of confusion about the true nature of
recent (perceived) ‘changes’. Some analysts perceive fundamental changes in the structure of the
production process and in the political regulation-system
1 governing that process. True, the
fundamental questions about government and politics, about market systems and about the relations
between the two have, for a long time, been major time-consuming issues of academic research and
political debate, as they were subjects of sublime thinking (e.g. Lindblom 1977; Heilbroner 1985). Yet
today, there is a restless concern and widespread commotion about the future relation between the
territorial sovereignty and the ‘invisible hand’ of the market system, a solicitude which seems to be
more pronounced than some decades ago (Elkins 1995).
The threatening strength of global capitalism, the ‘new Leviathan’ (Ross and Trachte 1990), is
disciplining state- (e.g. regions) and non-state actors (e.g. trade unions) all over the globe. These actors
are shivering with fear, so the story goes, because the exit-option of global capital is submitting them
to  ‘slavish dependence’. The conditions imposed by productive and financial mobile capital are
narrowing the policy-options of national and regional governments. At least, this is what is proclaimed
in popular discours, in contrast to different findings of scientific research: the intensified threat posed
by the exit-option is the result, according to popular belief, of globalisation, a process which is
increasing the mobility of capital and extending the list of possible production-sites. But not only the
‘rank and file’ are turning towards globalisation when things get blurred.
Globalisation is the latest ‘buzzword’ to which observers resort when things seem different and they
cannot otherwise readily account for them.
2 That is why a great variety of activities are labeled as
globalisation, with the result that no widely accepted formulation of the concept has evolved: different
observers use it to describe different phenomena, and often there is little overlap among the various
usages.
3 The result is that the globalisation-terminology is subjective, ill-defined or somewhat vague.
This is not surprising as it encompasses a complex array of dynamic, interacting forces whose own
parameters are not easy to establish (Dent 1996).
There is a great diversity of interchangeable terms such as internationalisation, interdependence,
globalisation, and so on. But there are also very real dangers in not distinguishing clearly between
certain trends towards internationalisation and the versions of the globalisation thesis. It is often thecase that evidence from cautious arguments is then used carelessly to bolster more extreme ones, to
exaggerate and extrapolate modest changes, to build a common usage when there needs to be strict
differentiation of meanings. It also confuses public discussions and policy-making, reinforcing the
view that political actors can accomplish less than is actually possibly in a global system (Hirst and
Thompson 1996:4). Globalisation appears to be a myth, but a myth with a huge strategic importance.
As John F. Kennedy once stated: “The great enemy of truth is very often not the lie, deliberate,
contrived and dishonest, but the myth, persistent, persuasive and unrealistic.”(Lang and Hines
1993:149)
The myth of globalisation is suitable for a world without illusions, a myth that robs us of hope:
“One key effect of the concept of globalization has been to paralyse radical reforming national
strategies, to see them as unviable in the face of the judgement and sanctions of international markets”
(Hirst and Thompson 1996:1, who label the political impact of globalisation ‘the pathalogy of over-
diminished expectations’). Indeed, many over-enthusiastic analysts have gone beyond the evidence in
over-stating the extent of the dominance of world markets, their ungovernability and the powerlessness
of state-actors. Ruigrok and van Tulder (1995) explain the succes of the globalisation-myth by its
positive, if conflicting, connotations. Globalisation promises a better tomorrow, suggests harmony,
‘interdependence’, and appeals to the hope that old rivalries between people will be overcome.
Globalisation conveys an impression of strength, of healthy and vigorously expanding firms and
economies, heading towards greater efficiency and increasing wealth. But, the final result is the same:
these powerful images mobilise support in various kinds of domestic bargaining arenas, where some
parties are struggling to maintain whatever influence they have over firms, trying to escape from this
arena, in order to comply with the rules of the global market (Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995:168-169).
The result of this ideological project is a popular, beit ‘wrong’ and misleading, perception: the idea
that the world is heading, in the next century, for a fundamental shift, a kind of ‘Great Transformation’
(Polanyi 1944): a century in which time nor place, history nor geography matters, in which global
capital is sourcing all over the globe, along and across borders, looking for the ultimate cost-reducing
site. In this battle of all against all, no single worker, state or firm is immune to this disciplining force.
According to this belief, the inviolable rules of the free market are setting workers against workers,
states against states, regions against regions. The borderless capital evaluates the state as too rigid and
corpulent and propagates, once again, the ideal of the ‘minimal state’. This state is withering away, the
Keynesian Welfare State (KWS) is disintegrating and is being replaced by the Schumpeterian Workfare
State (SWS): the classic (European) KWS, is undergoing strong incentives, perhaps dictates, towards
drastic adjustment. But the national state and society are not the only ones submitted to the SAP
(structural adjustment program), drafted by the marketplayers.Is the ‘propensity to barter, truck and exchange one thing for another’, as Adam Smith (1976) puts it
in his ‘Theory of Moral Sentiments’, is the simple fact of survival in the economic rat race rendering
the construction of a political community of (sub)states more difficult than the creation of the state was
many decades ago? The question is: does the contemporary ‘Economic Man’ prevent the construction
of a community of regions as he was once responsible for the construction of a community of citizens
at the level of the national state? So, in this paper on the mental dimension of globalisation, we must
also address the analysis to the empirical dimension of globalisation. The modern version of ‘beggar-
they-neighbour’, the competitive provision of investment-incentives, is necessitating the structural
adjustment at all political levels governing the socio-economic domain. Because of the delegation of
important parts of the socio-economical policy-domains towards the regional government, these too (so
the story continues) are forced to play the game. This obsession with competition, intensified by
globalisation, is complicating a ‘common regional understanding’.
Therefore, the following questions seem, at first sight, quite evident: How can the regions counter
these ‘structural adjustment programs’ without a adequate institutional apparatus at the Union level,
capable of protecting regional interests in the global economy? How can regions compensate for their
insignificance in the huge global economy? The point is that these questions are the product of the
myth of globalisation, proclaiming the irrelevance of ‘place’ in the global economy and setting one
spacial configuration (regions, states and continents) against each other. The point is further that it
won’t come to that, which is not the same as declaring that there is nothing new nor worrisome worth
mentioning.
What is known in political geography as the ‘jumping of scales’ has indeed changed the relationship
between different policy-levels. The ‘regional question’ at the turn of the century is a difficult one: how
can the regions ‘defy the obligations of the global production system’ without rendering a community
of regions impossible before it is fully constructed? The answer is rather peculiar: by not buying the
story!
This paper will try to argue and reason that proposition. This means that it is not, at first, a paper
about empirical globalisation, the structural transition of production system, trade, investment, NIC’s,
etc. Although I will briefly and selective consider these trends
4, the main message is one of criticizing
a belief, a perception that shapes the definition of the situation. That definition of a specific situation -
which is a human construction not an inescapable
5 objective fact - is determing human behaviour. One
message of this rather theoretical and abstract paper is that there is no acceptable and suitable way to
deliberate how much of the general fear for the harmful effects of globalisation can be justified on the
basis of scientific research. The point is that in the minds of the masses
6 the global restructuring
process has become a certainty, an unavoidable fact. My thesis is that as an empirical phenomenon,globalisation is indeed a major overstatement: that in the empirical reality, globalisation is not so
progressed as general perception asserts. But at the whole, globalisation seems to be an addictive
mindgame. Therefore, this theoretical paper will deal with the mental, ideological dimension of
globalisation and suggest a potential point of view, a possible approach of current evolutions.
2.Never judge a book by its cover.
2.1 Political preconditions.
The benevolent compliance with the ‘best-practice’ of the ‘post-Westphalian order’ is noticeable in
most European countries. All the major actors of the socio-economic system
7, workers, firms and the
state, enter to a high degree into the logic of the global process of restructuring shaping the outline of
contemporary society: deregulation, privatisation, liberalisation and competition. When reading
successful books from influential writers, such as Robert Reich’s ‘The Work of Nations’ (1991) or
Lester Thurow’s ‘Head to Head’ (1992), it seems like the only solution left. The Economist has put
into winged words the central idea of this ‘pensée unique’: “In much of the world over the past 20
years, thinking on the proper roles of government and the market has changed profoundly. It is no
exaggeration to call this change a conservative revolution. Almost everywhere, and far more than
modern ‘centre-left’ parties are willing to admit, what was once regarded as conservative thinking has
become the new economic orthodoxy. In many cases the traditional debate between ‘left’ and ‘right’
has been abandoned altogether (...). In others the ground has shifted to questions that used to be
regarded as of secondary importance. For instance, rather than arguing about the merits of privatising
state-owned enterprises, political parties are more likely to disagree about exactly how, once privatised,
the enterprises should be regulated. Almost everywhere, the old left has capitulated. Almost
everywhere, ‘modern’ centre-left parties are much like traditional, moderate conservative parties,
though with up-to-date public relations and added self-righteousness. As a result, the range of policy
choices receiving serious consideration has narrowed dramatically. In this new consensus - in theory, at
least, though by no means always in practice -  markets have the upper hand. Taxes and public
spending are best kept low; public borrowing is dangerous; inflation is not to be tolerated; explicit
economic intervention by the state must always be justified. This much and more is common
ground.”(The Economist, apr. 18
th 1998) The conservative revolution, with Ronald Reagan
(Reaganomics) and Margareth Thatcher (Thatcherism) and their respective advisers Milton Friedman
and Friedrich August von Hayeck as banner-bearers, revived the ‘conventional wisdom’ that the ideal
state was a minimal state and that deregulation, liberalisation, privatisation and competition was to
become the strategic instrument of all  governments.These political conditions stimulated the worldwide expansion of economic activity, made possible
by a series of technological advancements. Trade, foreign direct investment, merger and acquisition,
manufacturing rights, outsourcing, global networks, transnational corporations and many other ‘hot
issues’ are being conscientious analyzed in order to capture the state of affairs at the end of the
twentieth century. But one of the topics generally considered in this context is, in view of the subject of
this congres,  particularly relevant: the idea that regions are, to a high degree, in competition with one
another. In the era of ‘hypercompetition’, described in the influential book of Richard d’Aveni (1994),
the message is no longer ‘creative destruction’ à la Schumpeter but mainly ‘destroy competition’.
2.2 Glocalisation as an acceptable compromise?
As Roland Axtmann puts it, there should not be any kind of antagonistic relation between
globalisation and (macro-)regionalisation: “The globalisation of the economy is driven by the
interpenetration of the advanced capitalist countries and in particular by the intensification of transfers
among three economic macroregions: North America/United States, East Asia/Japan and
Europe/European Union. (...) Economic globalisation has a pronounced geographic dimension. It has
led to economic regionalization and political attempts to institutionalize regional economic
cooperation.” (Axtmann 1997:34) Globalisation was ‘driven by’ and ‘has led to’ regionalisation. Cause
and consequence, the ultimate illustration of the intertwined bound
8 between globalisation and
regionalisation?
Anyway, two different metaphors are used to characterize the current state of interdependence.
Given the wealth of data that is used to support each of these metaphors, it is increasingly difficult,
according to Andrew Wyatt-Walter (1995), to discern which of them, regionalization or globalisation,
better describes our present situation. As the GATT stated, 52 per cent of world trade in 1990 was
intra-regional, or within trading blocs. In contrast, the UN’s World Investment Report 1992 suggests
that the increasingly central role of transnational firms in the world economy necessitates that we do
away with our state-centric understanding of the world economy. There is no evident answer to the
question which metaphor is most suitable to describe the empirical dimension of reality. In important
respects, so Wyatt-Walter continues, they are both misleading as representations of a broader reality.
Second, both regionalisation and globalisation are slippery and imprecise concepts, reducing their
value as metaphors. Third, while regionalising and globalising tendencies are both at work in the
contemporary world, these tendencies are at present more symbiotic than contradictory. Therefore,
Wyatt-Walter concludes that neither regionalidation nor the metaphor of globalisation is entirely
helpful.In spite of these critical remarks - for which Wyatt-Walter only serves as an example - on the
vagueness of both concepts and the ambiguous interpretable data used to defend them, there is a
general accepted consensus
9 that according to the results of a great majority of the scientific research
on that matter, regionalisation is the most fitting term to describe the current state of interdependence,
especially in the case of the EU. The data used are blatant: economic exchanges and operations are, for
the time being, predominantly concentrated within a specific (macro-)region. This means that in
general, economic globalisation is not so global at all. Even the operations of multinationals
10 continue
to vary systematically along national lines. Keller and Pauly (1997)
11 consider the global corporation as
a myth.
12
However, according to Michael Newman (1996) it seems reasonable to suggest that the global
economy is the more dominant interlocking system since its constraining pressures would exist
irrespective of the existence of the EU and because the latter is, at least in part, an attempt to control
some of them. That is why globalisation and regionalisation are no antagonistic terms: regionalisation
as a strategy to restrict and control some of the pressures of globalisation. Indeed, since economic
transfers are increasingly evolving on a supra-national cross-border level most states, irrespective of
their size and location in a specific region, are to some degree subjected to William Greider’s (1997)
manic logic. So, after this utmost brief selection of the different visions and argumentation on
globalisation/regionalisation, one thing is certainly clear: only a nuanced answer, that leaves room for
exceptions and variation, is suitable.
The end of the postwar Fordist regulation at the beginning of the 1970s went hand in hand with an
intensification of the ongoing changes in the international division of labour (Fröbel, Heinrichs and
Kreye 1980). In the words of James Mittelman, “the familiar imagery of a core, semi-pheriphery, and
periphery no longer applies to a new structure that envelopes both vertically integrated regional
divisions of labour based on the distinctive comparative advantages of different locations, and
horizontally diversified networks wich extend their activities into neighbouring countries as part of
corporate strategies of diversification and globalization.”(Mittelman 1997:77) The world today seems
more integrated than the one in which Lenin wrote his analysis of imperialism. But, it’s not only a mere
impression that there is something different about the scales on which human activities develop.
An interesting idea is the concept of ‘jumping of scales’, a concept contrived by geography. I will
apply this concept to the subject under consideration because it enables to clarify things in a broader
perspective. In short, Swyngedouw (1996, s.d.) considers scale no longer as fixed, stable and frozen
moments. Scale is neither ontologically given nor a politically neutral discursive strategy. The current
process of re-scaling has important political consequences and some clear empowering-disempowering
effects. Scales of social regulation/reproduction and scales of production have changed, but whilesocial regulation tended to move downward (individual, region), scales of production have become
supranational, certainly cross-border. Furthermore, social relations, of which power is an inherent
feature, are framed in a specific spatial-temporal dimension. Power has, in many cases, to do with
control over a specific space or scale (local, regional, national, global), for as long as possible or
necessary: the alliances which social groups or classes forge over a certain spatial scale will shape the
conditions of appropriation and control over place and have a decisive influence over relative socio-
spatial power positions. Existing scales are the result of preceding struggles for power and can be
adapted to the changes in social (power) relations. In other words, the dominance of a certain scale -
e.g. the national level - in a political system is the outcome of a power-relation and simultaneously
influences the continuation of that relation.
The increased mobility of capital, goods, services and information, has severe consequences for the
distribution of power within a certain society and exerts influence on the scale at which regulation of
production will be determined. In other words, the power to move, and - the real point - to move more
than others, is of huge social significance. It must be underlined that it is relative mobility which is at
issue. The mechanism is simple: the relatively mobile/powerful try to stabilise the power position
sources of others in part by tying them down in place (Massey 1996), while possessing the freedom and
ability to overcome space by commanding scale. In short, place matters, but scale decides. The spaces
of the circulation of capital have been upscaled, while regulating the Fordist production/consumption
nexus has been down-scaled, shifting the balance of power. It is here that Swyngedouw introduces the
concept glocalisation
13, the re-scaling of the state.
So, power is based on the relative mobility of some and on the fixation of their opponents on a
certain scale. Capital derives power from increased mobility, enabled by the process of globalisation,
and from the selective refusal of political actors to organize accurately on the same European scale,
since they are unwilling to hand over more deciding competences, for instance in the field of social
regulation, to that scale. Indeed, there have been some formal transfers of competences in that field, but
they do not entirely amount to a real, meaningful competence of the EU on, for instance, social security
and legislation. These competences have in several EU-member states been partially transferred to the
micro-regional level, while the Union itself was chosen for the ‘high politics’ of the EMU and
Maastricht-criteria, enabling the Union to define the general contours of economic processes and the
national scope for policymaking. The change of the relative importance of scales, the fragmentation of
competences in the field of social and labour policies, employment policies, etc., is what ‘jumping of
scales’ is about: “This (stretching process) is a process driven by class, ethnic, gender and cultural
struggles. On the one hand, domineering organizations attempt to control the dominated by confining
the latter and their organizations to a manageable scale. On the other hand, subordinated groupsattempt to liberate themselves from these imposed scale constraints by harnessing power and
instrumentalities at other scales. In the process, scale is actively produced.” (Jonas 1996, o.c. in
Swyngedouw 1996)
Let me take the argument a little bit further, on the slippery field of devising an debatable
supposition, by extrapolating this reasoning on a pure hypothetical basis. The objective of this far-
reaching exaggeration is to draw the attention on a quite modest, simple but neglected thesis. My only
intention is to illuminate a pure theoretical assumption, which is not an empirical observation, in order
to take into consideration what must be considered as one possible approach. This approach, which is
one out of many, could possibly have some value in understanding current transformations. It is a point
of view which could be considered in research conducted with an open mind.
One could suggest, as an unprovable and speculative hypothesis, that it becomes an interesting
strategy for domineering industrial groups, to emphasise differences/competition
14 between, for
instance, regions. At least it could be a pleasant stroke of luck if those differences between ‘we and
them’ were becoming important
15, if dominated groups such as workers were tied down in a certain
place (their region) on a certain scale/policy level (the region/national state). The downward jumping
of scales of several competences which determines to a high degree the cost of production in that
place
16 is not only favorable for the demassification of labour but also implies an incitation of setting
one region against the other. When regions, in a hypercompetitive context of perceived globalisation,
are partially responsible for the determination of the production costs it can be expected that, given the
modern version of beggar-they-neighbour - in which each region strives to do better than the others in
attracting new investment and keeping existing activities - the construction of a community of regions
is complicated by the common perception that there is a firm economic competition between them.
After all, it is not improbable that a slightly pathological form of the discourse of competition defiles
the minds of leaders and masses.
17
However, there is little new about suchlike conclusions. For instance, Engels indicated in ‘The
conditions of the working class in England’ (1968), written in 1845, that the power of unions was
dependent on the place and scale on which they were organised. So, it seems to be a recurrent
phenomenon that, during periods of great social, economic, cultural, political and ecological turmoil
and disorder - wich we try to capture with the label globalisation -important processes of geographical
re-scaling take place that interrogate existing power lines while constructing new ones. Swyngedouw
underlines that changes in scales of production/reproduction can go either upward or downward, but
will always express new power relations and shift the balances more to one side than to another. Over
the past decades, it has indeed been mainly capital that ‘jumped’ upward while in many cases (and with
varying degrees of resistance) the regulation of labour conditions and other cost-relevant competencesmoved downward. Regulatory codes, norms and institutions as well as economic processes are
spatially jumping from one scale to another.
The increased significance of the enterprise in collective bargaining is an indication of the
downward movement of social regulation. The division of tasks, based on the Fordist compromise, was
regulated at a national level. The bureaucratic regulation of the wage nexus at the scale of the national
state was something which the labour movement struggled hard for throughout most of the century.
That regulation became more problematic when a significant part of the production system
supranationalised or when a majority of the mass workers-confronted cheap import competition. The
argument of this paper, developped in section three, is that it is not very relevant if these processes are
just perceived or believed rather than to be justified on the basis of empirical research. The lowering of
the scale of work and social regulation towards an individual and regional level coincided with a
heightening of the scale at wich the general framework of the economy and capital were regulated,
namely at the level of the EMU. This detachment of the regulation of different aspects of the economic
cycle, which was assured under Fordism by a national social compromise and led to the virtuous circle
of the ‘Golden Age’ (the historical exceptional period of prosperity and progress between 1950 and
1970; see Maddison 1991) is what is changing the relevance of the scales under consideration.
2.3 Gone with the wind.
Indeed, the reproduction of social relations under Fordism was anchored at the national level. A
complex assemblage of formal and informal codes, practices and regulations, based on a profound
common understanding, governed the socio-economic system. Before post-war Fordism, these
mechanisms were also embedded at the local level while under Fordism they became predominantly
part of the national institutionalized compromise and an essential foundation of the Keynesian welfare
state.
It is tempting, in this era of globalisation, to predict the degeneration of the national state. There
seems to be a widespread conviction among opinion leaders that the national state will be blown away
by globalisation, with the force of the North Italian ‘trompaderra’, or that the national state will be
undressed and hollowed out by the upward (European integration), downward (regionalism,
devolution) and outward (privatisation) scaling of competences, or that, at least, the national state will
be severely dislocated by the gentle breeze of structural transformations it has to go through in order to
adjust to the ‘incentives’ of the ideology of competition. This transformation will take the state away
from Fordism, towards something different (post-Fordism). Indeed, the relative position and
importance of the state is shifting in decisive ways when the market imperatives become theideological and political legitimation of institutional reforms. That ‘silent revolution’, by which the
Keynesian welfare state is gradually and almost imperceptible transformed in to a Schumpeterian
workfare state, is according to a temporal majority of scientist generated by the trade and production
changes that have often led to signicifant economic and social dislocations (e.g McClintock 1996;
Martin 1994). I will not ruminate the argumentation on that matter, explained with great craftsmanship
by others (Burrows and Loader 1994; Bonefeld and Holloway 1991), but will only briefly mention
what could be the significance of that shift for the subject of this paper: the relationship between
regions in the context of the EU construction. A relation which, from a strategic point of view and
given the logic of collective action, necessitates a common understanding between regions in the light
of their interest mediation.
It must be clear, I do not believe the ‘withering away’ or ‘hollowing out’ thesis is correct. It is
however a fact that the national and regional
18 state is undergoing profound changes. It is also quite
evident that the state will continue to be a first-rate player, since no economic system, not even a free
market, can do without it. The question is how much scope for policymaking there is left or how
dependent the state is on the signals of the ‘hidden hand’? In their interesting study, Palan, Abbott and
Deans (1996) enumerate several state strategies in the global political economy indicating the variation
of strategies states have at their disposal.
19 As they declare, while the uniqueness of national social
formations ensures that there will not be a single unified response to globalisation, there is little
evidence to support the idea that globalisation is not having a profound and transformative impact
upon the entire spectrum of political systems. It is not possible here to treat this matter into detail, but
attentive observers will agree that a hype of the ‘competition state theory’
20 can be discerned, a theory
which passes on that states can and should enhance ‘their’ competitiveness. The ‘capitalist
developmental state’ in East Asia, wrongdoer in the eyes of the West, is probably the most close to the
‘competition state’ ideal and is sometimes suggested as the ‘best practice’.
21
This rage can be interpreted negatively, because the logic of the situation forces states increasingly
into a zero-sum-game as they compete over market shares (e.g. Susan Strange 1988, 1995, 1996)
22, or
positively as the OECD, IMF and other adherents of the ‘Washington Consensus’ seem to do: states
will benefit from the adjustment towards the ‘pensée unique’. Anyway, a redifinition of the role and
function of the state is the catchphrase. Redistribution, the mainstay of the Fordist state, has been
relegated. The creation of a stable environment of accumulation - by providing financial stability,
infrastructure, an educated workforce, a favourable tax system, etc.
23 - comes first.
As Linda Weiss (1998) only recently explained, the idea of the powerless state is a myth, beit a
paralysing one. The state is not without power. However, current evolutions seem to suggest that all
states are subjected to the same insuperable force, wich we label - for convenience’s sake -globalisation. Convenient because it identifies an enemy: other countries, regions, workers, against
which we must defend ourselves. That is, in many cases, where the ‘competition state’, the post-
Fordist
24 SWS is about. The basis of the last is flexibility. Post-Fordism can be defined as a flexible
production system based on flexible machines or labour systems and an appropriately workforce. Bob
Jessop: “In seizing on these new or recharged sources of flexibility, capitalists hope to overcome the
alienation and resistance of the mass worker, the relative stagnation of Taylorism and mass production,
competitive threats from low-cost exporters in the Third World and the relative saturation of markets
for standardised mass-produced goods.” (Jessop 1994:19)
25
As a stable mode of macro-economic growth, post-Fordism is based on the dominance of a flexible
and permantly innovative economic accumulation. As a social mode of economic regulation, post-
Fordism involves supply-side innovation and flexibility in each of the main areas of regulation.
26 The
predominance of micro-electronics-based information and communication technologies, flexibility and
permanent innovation are the solicitudes of the SWS. So, Jessop declares, its distinctive objectives in
economic and social reproduction are the promotion of product, process, organisational and market
innovation in open economies in order to strenghten as far as possible the structural competitivenes of
the national economy by intervening on the supply side
27 and in order to subordinate social policy
28 to
the needs of labour market flexibility and to the constraints of international competition. As Jessop
indicates, the internationalisation emphasises the character of wages as costs of production. Therefore
the basic domestic premises
29 of Keynesian welfarism are called into question.
To bring this discussion to an end, it is clear that the SWS has various tasks to fulfill, ranging from
R&D, promotion of new sectors creating innovative technological capacities, education, infrastructure,
new legal forms for cross-national cooperation and strategic alliances, an intellectual property regime,
the subordination of welfare policy to the demands of flexibility, ... to all kinds of other activities
concerning the management of the process of internationalisation itself, in the hope of minimising its
harmful domestic repercussions and securing maximum benefit to its own national ‘located’ or home-
based firms and banks. So, it is clear that the SWS is not without assignment, requiring at least a
sizeable remainder of previous powers because these tasks are situated in the field of national
competences or are downscaled towards the regions. The upscaled competences influence, to a high
degree, only laterally and indirectly the above-mentioned, since competences of the EU are mainly
designed to shape the general (fiscal, budgetary, monetarily, competition, social, environmental, etc.)
framework of the European economy. Indeed, a framework which becomes increasingly thorough,
influential and less ‘frame’. Nevertheless, that framework also leaves - for the time being?- sufficient
room for determinative national and regional competences, and thus differences.2.4 The smoking gun.
Of equal importance to the question if globalisation or regionalisation is the most suitable metaphor,
is the one about the impact of cross-border economic interactions on the situation of the majority of the
inhabitants of a given region. Is it possible to determine an effect of the increased global
interdependence on the standard of living of the average citizen?  Is it possible to determine how much
of the popular belief can be based and legitimised by the findings of empirical enquiry? Is it possible to
determine if the increasingly global level of cross-border economic interactions is the perpetrator in
this exciting story? Academic researchers are assuming the role of Sherlock Holmes and come to the
conclusion, one again, that competition with remote nations is not responsible for the greater part of
the increase of unemployment and wage inequality. But, ‘for the greater part’ leaves room for deviation
from this general rule.
According to Brand (1997:57), the key fact about the situation of working people today is their
widening exposure to the international division of labor. The extent of this exposure is shown by the
growth in the volume of world trade, by the changes in its composition, and by the geographical shift it
has undergone. Therefore, for Brand ‘it is hard to see why’ people like Paul Krugman underestimate
the relation between globalisation and the position of national and regional residents. William Pfaff
(1996) phrased another deviation from the general rule when he took a clear position in International
Herald Tribune: “The poor we will have always with us (...). The investor will always find another
labor pool to tap when the existing one becomes inconveniently exigent. (...) Bargaining now is
impossible for any task that can be exported. This now is universally true. This transformation in the
transition of labor in the advanced countries, as well as in the developing world, is permanent.” Not
only the ‘rank and file’ are perceiving a global labourmarket with lasting and sweeping consequences.
Even amongst erudites, there seems to be a lot of confusion about the real impact of globalisation on
the well-being of the majority of the national and regional constituents (e.g. Burbach, Núñez and
Kagarlitsky 1997; Miliband 1989).
Scientific research has not found ‘the smoking gun’, as Peter Gottschalk en Mary Joyce (1995) put
it so nicely. Research tryed, by chipping away at existing explanations, to reduce the list of plausible
explanations that could not endure empirical tests. These explanations were build to explain
unemployment in Europe and the increased wage inequalities in the USA, the sharp increase in demand
for high-skilled workers and why, at the same time, competition eroded the position of low-skilled
workers, who had to ‘compete with low-skilled workers in the rest of the world’. Enumerating the
results of the great amount of empirical research on that matter is simply impossible. Yet, professionals
engaged with the subject will tell you that the effect is rather minimal.For instance, the IMF Working Paper on ‘The Effects on Wages in the Advanced Economies’ by
Matthew J. Slaughter and Phillip Swagel (1997)
30 which summarizes a long list of research on the
connection between globalisation and labour markets in advanced economies. Focussing on the impact
of imports from developping countries on wages, employment and income inequality, the consensus of
empirical research suggests that increased trade accounts for only about 10 to 20 percent of the changes
in wages and income distribution in the advanced economies. Furthermore, it is indicated that the more
important influence on labour markets in the 1980s and 1990s has been a technology-driven shift in
labour demand away from less-skilled workers and towards more-skilled workers. Particularly with
respect to import competition, popular beliefs appear to be at odds with the emperical evidence that
this aspect of globalisation has had only modest effect on wages, employment, and income inequality.
So, global cross-border economic interaction can’t be blamed? Or is this jumping to conclusions,
rather than of scales? Modesty is in order since, although the overall changes in employment and in
wage inequalities are too large to be explained by the changing trade and price patterns of
internationalisation, we cannot precisely measure the relative importance of specific factors, e.g. trade
and technology (Sachs and Schatz 1994:4). Dani Rodrik, author of ‘Has globalization gone too
far’(1997), made an interesting remark on the great variation of results: “I think that, over time, the
variance of the estimates has been rising, so that some economists are willing to attach a larger impact
and others are saying that the effect is more nearly zero or even possibly positive. I think that the right
way to think about this is that there is a variance of estimates and that we have to be mindful of
that.”(Challenge 1998)
31 In other words, we should take into consideration the variation of results from
research trying to find the smoking gun and we must be aware of the fact that the only consensus
possible is that the effects are ‘rather limited’, and not about their precise magnitude.
Assuming, for the sake of the argument, that these figures are correct and that competition with
developping countries is responsible for 10 to 20% of the decrease of wages and increase of
employment in advanced countries, what is the relevance of this knowledge? That 80 to 90% of the
analysed  evolutions are due to other factors, such as technology? That, in quantitative terms, the fear is
exagerated and highly irrational? That one must not be so afraid of competition with remote countries,
firms and workers since this fear is not empirical justifiable: our limited business with these sites has
only a minor effects on our income and employment-situation. But, how much is 20%? Enough or
ridiculous little? Is there any possible and acceptable way of drawing a line from which a fear of global
competition can be justified? Who can decide that 20% is (not) enough to justify the widespread
fear
32? On what basis can one draw such line? Who determines that convention? Popular conviction,
since the majority is never wrong? Who is covered by this 20%? As in section 2.2, the message is
clear: in general, we are not involved in a lethal competition with remote, cheating countries who basetheir competitive advantages on the exploitation of labour conditions, tax regulation, subsidies, etc. But
some of us are, as spectacular examples indicate. And, it is believed, ‘it could happen to anyone,
everywhere’.
2.5 Denotation and connotation
What does it mean, if rich countries are mainly doing business with one another
33, although the fact
that trade with and FDI towards NIC’s and other members of the Triad have increased profoundly for
many years now
34? What does it mean, if European countries are preponderantly doing business with
other members of the continent, as the research suggests? It means that most trade in the world
economy is driven by income: the big importers are the richest countries, that geography matters since
neighbouring countries tend to trade with each other much more than with the rest of the world. Even
Wyatt-Walter acknowledges that regionalisation was more pronounced in ‘fortress Europe’. More
importantly it means - next to the assumption that competition may be ‘hyper’, as some assert - that
competition is also mainly ‘European’.
The obsession with competitiveness is, however, not a specific European phenomenon. The idea
that a country’s or region’s economic fortunes are largely determined by its succes on world markets is
a very popular, global hypothesis. But as Paul Krugman (1997) stated, not a necessary truth: as a
practical, empirical matter that hypothesis is flatly wrong. It is simply not the case that the world’s
leading nations are to any important degree in economic competition with each other or that any of
their major economic problems can be attributed to failures to compete on world markets. So, the
growing obsession in most advanced nations with international competition should be seen, not as a
well-founded concern, but as a view held in the face of overwhelming contrary but neglected evidence.
Rather than re-running that evidence, the central question must be why this obsession flourishes, in the
face of that evidence. The position taken by Paul Krugman is perhaps an extreme one, underestimating
the impact of some of the (modest) objective-empirical facts and figures on globalisation. By drowning
the statistics, facts and figures of the followers of the globalisation-thesis in the deep see of numbers on
GDP, international trade and investment, Krugman is probably doing wrong to the observed trends
towards globalisation.
Since obsessions are rarely rational considerations, one must also look for the answer in the realm of
irrational convictions. I shall return to this point in section 3. First, I must adduce some other aspects of
the argument.
The meaningful consequence of the fact that the economic competition, in Europe, is mainly
European - rather than a violent struggle against NIC’s, Japan or the USA - is that the outcome of thissteering principle of social allocation is dependent on the performance of socio-economic actors in
individual EU-members. Since research has indicated that the EU is a very regionalized macro-region,
with a high degree of internal interdependence and interaction, the ‘internal’ not the global market is
the first battlefield. But political-institutional (d)evolutions have, in all major European countries,
shifted important socio-economic competences upwards and downwards, away from the nation-state.
In the European market, the political option has been to transfer competences towards the macro-
regional EU-level and towards the micro-regional level. Both are chapters of the same story.
The competences entrusted to the EU are ‘high economics’, by analogy with ‘high politics’: the
construction of a common macro-economic framework, shaping the European market e.g. by means of
the ECB, a common budgetary and financial policy, etc. Social Europe is according to some mainly
limited to window-dressing. Anyway, the general and superficial competences of the EU in the social
field are without a truly decisive influence on the course of economic activity and on the decisions on
the location of production. Due to national differences and incompatibilities, the social regulation of
the European market is still mainly established at the level of the member states. And, as a result of
regional and nationalistic tendencies within some EU-members, parts of the power to regulate the
social framework of the market have been assigned to the regional authorities.
In other EU-members the process of regionalisation has not (yet) resulted in a meaningful transfer of
competences enabling the regional state-level to influence the economic interactions. In several EU-
members, only apparently ‘soft’ competences, such as education, arts, infrastructure, environement,
etc. are placed in charge of the region. Apparently soft? Because of the perceived omnipotence of the
global competition and its far-reaching charisme, ‘soft’ issues increasingly become ‘hard’, economic
issues. This means that the majority of the competences of the regional authority will also be translated
into their economic relevance, in order to take their contribution to the wealth of the region into
consideration. Whatever the nature of the competences allocated to the region, it seems to be a
recurring reflex that they are for the greater part also interpreted as economically relevant factors, or at
least that the economic (most specifically cost-) consequences of each decision taken in the field of a
specific competence are taken into account. A very deciding reflection is whether a certain decision
deteriorates or improves the competitive position of those living in a region and since all regions or
states are captured by this logic, there seems to be no other way. The basic but wrong assumption
underlying this belief is that competition is a zero-sum game, an assumption which political rhetoric
illustrates daily when they warn us not to be a looser but a winner, who takes it all.
A pronounced illustration of the obsession with competition - wich is, of course, a superb
mechanism of allocation - and of the concern with the frightening others is the debate on labour costs.
A debate wich is often not deprived of misconceived arguments. In many cases, the participants in thisdebate focus on the variation in labour costs, e.g. between regions. As the European Commission
(1997) indicated in their anual report ‘Employment in Europe’, the extent of the variation in itself is of
relatively little significance. What matters instead is how far it is justified in relation to variations in
the productivity of labour, or in the contribution of labour to value-added, between regions. It is the
combination of wages and productivity, the unit labour costs, which is important since this determines
the labour element in the overall costs of producing in one part of the Union rather than another.
In 1992, the latest year for which comparable data at the regional level are available, average labour
costs in industry ranged from a minimum of arround 5 ECU an hour in the Portuguese regions and
around 7 ECU in Greece to 23-24 an hour in most parts of West Germany and in the Paris region, with
an apex of 27 ECU in the city of Hamburg.
35 In theory, labour costs should tend to be lower where the
productivity of labour, in terms of its contribution to the value-added, is also relatively low,
irrespective of the sector of activity in wich labour is employed. The EC is very clear on that matter:
“In practice, by far the greater part of the variation in labour costs between regions across Europe is
reflected in differences in labour productivity, in terms of value-added per hour worked. In terms of
unit labour costs, or the labour cost involved in producing in one part of the Union rather than another,
there is, therefore, much less regional variation and, for the most part, no systematic relationship
between average labour costs per person employed.” (European Commission 1997:81) In other words,
productivity differences tend to compensate for wage differences and there is little incentive, in this
regard at least, for firms to shift production from one region to another.
As any attentive reader will notice, there is a clear conditional nature in the above formulations: ‘by
far the greater part’, ‘for most part’, ‘tend to’ and ‘little incentive’. Why? Because these are general
conclusions, only valid on a high level of aggregation. This discrepancy between general theory and
conclusions on the one hand, and some individual, concrete cases and experiences
36 on the other, feeds
the fear for globalisation, stimulates the perception of a ‘global cutthroat competition’ and undermines
the acceptance of these general conclusions by the masses. Exceptions are extrapolated and considered
as the rule.
Anyway, the conclusions under attack indicate that competition is mainly European and, within the
Union, not based on interregional differences in labour costs. Furthermore, research also indicates that
competition is mainly between neighbouring countries and adjacent regions, which seems rather
evident
37 but nevertheless contrasts with some impressions. This means that competition is mainly
between societies with a similar legislation and regulation, welfare system, etc.. Of course, there are
differences and because of them there is room for intra-Union relocation and social dumping, but these
are smaller than believed.Let’s summarize before we continue the reasonging: regionalisation seems to be the most fitting
description of the course of economic interactions at the eve of the twentieth first century.
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Competition is increasingly global but, in our case, still mainly European. Behind the process of re-
scaling, one could imagine - on a pure theoretical basis - a struggle for power based on a simple
mechanism in wich capital tries to keep workers and regional authorities rather powerless, by tying
them up is a series of places, by emphasizing and using differences between them, by jumping
downwards with competences of severe cost-competitive importance. Within the EU, several
competences of overriding importance towards the costs of production on a specific site are assigned to
the regional authorities. The popular belief declares that (regional) governments, must bow to the
incentives of the free market, redesign the institutions and rewrite the regulations embedding that
market. Flexibility, deregulation, privatisation, cost-competitiveness on all domains to be influenced by
the competence of the regional authorities, these and others are the slogans urging regional
governments on to the (post-Fordist) adaptation of their territory, setting regions against regions and
jeopardizing a common understanding between these entities, an understanding necessary for the
efficient functioning of European system of ‘checks and balances’. In the face of overwhelming
contrary evidence.
3. The function of fiction.
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3.1 The burden of proof.
Fiction refers to the persistent popular belief that we are all mixed up in a death spiral of global
competition setting each nation and region against the other, outbidding each other in order to acquire
new investments and preserve existing ones. ‘Overwhelming’ contrary empirical evidence shows that it
is ‘flatly’ wrong. The question of this section is: what could possibly be the function of this fiction?
In section 2.2 on the relationship between power relations and ‘jumping of scales’, I drafted an
unprovable hypothesis. I’m not claiming that this hypothesis is only for the time being undemonstrable
and that, in future times, the rightness of the fantasy will be ready for critical empirical examination. It
is not true that this, at first sight pretty irrelevant, remark is the regrettable product of some persistent,
superseded and old-fashioned furious left wing ‘conspiracy-religion’ in which naughty capitalist were
tormenting defenceless and innocent citizens. Indeed, suchlike religions must be condemned in the
most severe terms. The objective is much more simple than all this: (over-)emphasising the role of
perception and ideology serves the goal of illuminating this underestimated and underrated factor,
neglected in major parts of the literature. The hypothesis on the empowering and disempowering
effects of re-scaling can and will not be tested here. The only purpose of this imperfect and criticizableprocedure is to instill the reader a critical reflection towards the significance of the positivist-empirical
research on globalisation for the explanation of human behaviour, to demonstrate that more is hidden
than is seen and to familiarize oneself with the idea that fiction could have an important function.
References to ‘potential globalisation’ are rather rare in the immense literature on this subject.
Kenneth Thomas phrased it clearly when he wrote in his Capital beyond Borders (1997) that the nature
of capital mobility has often been misunderstood: “To understand the importance of capital mobility in
the world’s political economy it is necessary to conceive of it as the potential to move capital and to
coordinate production across a wide geographical area. This shows its nature as a power resource and a
structuring factor in the world economy.” (Thomas 1997:73) The difference between the actual and
potential mobility and interdependence in the world economy is a reflection of that between general
theory and daily experiences. Potential globalisation as a concept refers to the use of capital mobility -
vis-à-vis states and labour - as a threat: it indicates the power of firms based on the threat to use their
(perceived and actual) ability to coordinate their production across a widening geograpical area and to
relocate production unless (e.g regional) governments agree to demands made by these companies.
This potential ability is credible on the basis of some (exceptional) actual experiences.
Finding more than anecdotal evidence for a rising pattern of threats is very difficult. There are some
possible and necessarily indirect methods (e.g. data on contract-settlement language restricting
management’s right to shut down or relocate production, provisions in collective bargaining, analysis
of published reports and coverages on threaths, opinion polls, considering ‘peak flows’ as the ‘limits of
the possible’) but the fact remains that there is a serious methodological problem.
40 The problem is that
the positivist-empirical method, wich is conventionally considered as the ‘best practice’, can only
observe and register things that ‘are’ or ‘have been’: actual, objective facts. Things that (probably)
‘will be’, but for the time being ‘haven’t been’, cannot be captured according to normal standards of
methodological correct research. One cannot measure events that have not (yet) taken place and
therefore, one cannot build an acceptable hypothesis on it. The only academic solution possible is the
formulation of an ‘educated guess’, a preview on future events, based on as much empirical evidence
as possible which renders the extrapolation acceptable. In contrast with what is often believed, popular
expectations, previews or prospectings on what future will bring us do have some meaningful effects,
here and now, even if it is very difficult to examine them using a conventional and acceptable
methodology.
3.2 Tomorrow is here, today.
41It is pretty irrelevant if these expectations are considered as scientific unacceptable because those -
the rank and file - believing them do not pay attention to such qualifications: the discrepancy between
the objective reality and subjective appreciation is for them of subordinate importance.
One. If people believe potential globalisation to become actual some day, they will adjust their
behaviour to that belief.
42 What they believe or fear to happen tomorrow has clear consequences, hic et
nun, for their behaviour and conviction. Human beings can, to a high degree, ‘create’ their own reality,
since, amongst other reasons, only humans possess a prospective faculty. Human behaviour is defined
by a set of social norms and expectations which creates a situation in which one can prophecy a given
outcome in a given situation.
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The self-fulfilling prophecy occurs when our ideas about something lead us, or someone else, to act
in ways that produce a confirmation of those ideas. For example, when we believe that we are involved
in a demanding competition with other regions, at first glance these regions indeed seem rather hostile:
we interpret all their actions as manifestations of our expectation. If masses
44 believe that ‘others’ try
to outbid us on the market of investments, we will interpret their actions, deals, policies, legislation,
etc. in that direction, whether that was their intention or not. So we will respond by ‘playing the game’
and defending our interests against others. Whether our expectations are correct or not has only little
effect on our beliefs and on the behaviour we base on it, our initial actions produce/stimulate the facts
that we expect, a self-fulfilling prophecy determines the outcome. How we act towards others and
think about them is communicated to the ‘opponents’, who then prepares for the same expected or
‘believed’ hypercompetition.
Two. What we believe others will do is part of the definition of the situation, the estimation of the
reality we live in. As Thomas and Thomas wrote in 1928, ‘if men define situations as real, they are real
in their consequences’(Thomas and Thomas 1928)
45. In other words, a person’s perceptions, not (only)
objective reality, will provide useful clues for understanding subsequent behaviour. People respond not
only to the objective features of a situation, but also (and often mainly) to the meaning this situation
has for them. The definition of the situation implies examination and deliberation, both influenced by
belief-systems, values, tradition, etc. of the society we live in. So, that definition is by no means free
and individual. If people define the situation they live in as one typified by global competition within
regional blocs and in which one has to adapt to the dictates of that global market in order to survive,
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than people will react accordingly and accept - with less protest and resistance - the structural
adjustment towards the competition state model of the SWS, downsizing and outsourcing,
relocalisation, etc. as if they were aspects of a natural, inevitable force.
Three. Dennis Wrong, in his masterly Power. It’s Forms, Bases and Uses (1995) indicates two
senses in which power is always potential. The first, a trivial one, is that it is meaningful to assert thatsomeone has power even when not engaged in exercising it if there is no reason to doubt his ability and
disposition to exercise it on future occasions as he has in the past.
47 The second, more significant and
complex sense in which power is potential is summed up in Carl Friedrich’s (1937, 1963) well known
phrase ‘the rule of anticipated reactions’: people may react to the possessor or controller of resources
by anticipating the effective use of these resources to control their own actions.
48 This means that
people take actions based on their anticipations of what the alleged powerfull whish them to do in the
relevant circumstances,
49 even in the absence of observable communications or actions from those
considered as powerfull. This is the debate, which I cannot explain here, on ‘non-decision making’
(Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Lukes 1974), on latent power based on anticipated reactions in which the
raising of issues that pose a challenge to the interests and goals of the power holders can be prevented.
This third aspect explains why people, like union members, hesitate to express more ‘radical’ demands
- e.g. an increase of the tax on profits, of the unemployment benefits - because if they do (anticipation),
firms will relocate (reaction) as this exit-option is much more credible in the era of globalisation
(perception, definition of the situation). These issues will not be raised (agenda-setting, non-decision)
even in the absence of any act or message on the part of those firms, even in the absence of the
expression of the perceived threat (inaction).
So, it is extremely difficult to capture potential globalisation by means of standard scientific
procedures since the course of this process depends on inaction, perception, non-decision,
interpretation, etc., which can only with greath difficulty be approached by the positivist-empirical
operating procedures. And yet, this somewhat impalpable and intangible concept potential
globalisation is shaping the behaviour of so many actors, including regional authorities, by means of
the mechanisms just mentioned.
In sum, reading one, two and three together leads us to the evaluation that there is something
peculiar about the ways through which globalisation affects the relations between regions. Not only by
imposing ‘objective’, actual threats and challenges
50, but also - and this is the central point - by
creating a certain state of mind, a subjective definition of the situation which stimulates what we
expect to happen, since our ideas about global competition lead us and - given that this ‘unique
thinking’ is also very popular in other regions - others to act in ways that produce a confirmation of
those ideas. Globalisation is at the same time cause and result, fact and value, a new expression of an
old regularity, a name for the tumultuous restructuring of production processes, for the changing
significance of the spatial-temporal locus and for the re-scaling of competences. A suchlike
classification demands the most of classic research, wich is based on ideas going back to the Age of
Reason. Conclusion.
The general argument is that this era of neo-liberalism and increased globalisation has actually
influenced and circumscribed the extent of the autonomy that previously existed at the national
51 and
sub-national level. This does not mean that it has ended it entirely. Regional and national governments
continue to retain considerable leverage over their economies. On the other hand, it is true that the idea
of reducing the say of political authorities over the market is, in general, considered as a best practice
of competition-policy. However, that is just what it is: an idea, a mental convention. Minimizing
regional or national state influence is not a natural, irrefutable, insuperable and unshakable given,
independent of human intervention. It is the explicit result of human behaviour which is, as ever, based
on the definition of ones situation, a definition which is the result of values, perceptions, experiences
and so on.
This is not to say that nothing changed.
52 The critical attitude towards the state-centric approaches
are completely justified and the ontological primacy of the state should indeed be seriously
questioned.
53 Globalisation has increased the credibility of the exit option of an ever more mobile
capital, has stimulated the incorporation of ever larger territories in the capitalist market system, etc.
(as it was, at the same time, the result of those evolutions) and has therefore changed the rules of the
game. So, the ‘hollowing out’ of the KWS is not entirely imaginary: in spite of the fact that the
national and regional state is still political significant and retains much of its formal sovereignty - as a
ineffective, primarily juridical fiction?- its capacities to project its formal power are weakened. It has,
however, not vanished. Yet, the common perception seems to be that these remains of glorious times
must be brought into action in order to please mobile entrepreneurs and that the tendency towards a
SWS - or any other version of the competition state - is inevitable since other states and regions are
exhausting themselves to do the same, trying to snatch away existing and new investments. This
discourse of competition, a concept that evolved from a instrument for efficient organisation and
allocation towards a absolute criterium for all government qualifications, is endangering interregional
solidarity, which is necessary for a collective interest mediation. As Mancur Lloyd Olson (1965, 1982)
indicated, solidarity and harmony are important ingredients for a divided community to accomplish
common goals, such as a representation at the European level. Or better, a community with perceived
divided and antagonistic interests is not evident.
On the road to the construction/completion of an European Community or ‘Union of regions’ - a
mechanism of uniting, through the principle of subsidiarity, remote supranational integration with the
policy level more close to the integrated  - we still have a long way ahead of us. Not only objective
facts but also subjective interpretations can be an impediment to traffic. And the latter can be avoided.1 The concept of ‘regulation’, and many other of my insights and points of departure, are based on the ‘Theory
of the Regulation School’. For an introduction: Boyer (1990). The Regulation School shares some resemblance
with the ‘Theory of Social Structures of Accumulation’. For an introduction: Kotz, McDonough and Reich
(1994).
2 According to Roland Robertson (1992), globalisation is best understood as indicating the problem of the form
in terms of which the world becomes ‘united’, but by no means integrated in naive functionalist mode.
Globalization as a topic is a conceptual entry to the problem of ‘world order’ in the most general sense, a
phenomenon which clearly requires a interdisciplinary treatment. It is clear that even something as the global-
local nexus was thematized as long ago as the second century BC when Polybius in his Universal History wrote
about the rise of the Roman empire. The discussion on globalisation is not new, because -as many studies have
diagnosed - globalisation is not new, but we must limit the analysis to the relatively recent past.
3 The popular diffusion and the conflicting use of the concept ‘globalization’ is, according to Rosenau
(1997:360) not so much a reflection of evasive confusion, as they are an early stage in a profound ontological
shift, a restless search for new ways of understanding unfamiliar phenomena.
4 Since they are disclosed in several masterful studies, it should be a waste of the limited space I have at my
disposal to simply ruminate these relevant findings.
5 E.g. the remark ‘”Globalization is a reality not a choice. ‘You can run but you can’t hide’ might serve as a
mantra for the age.” (Haass and Litan 1998:6)
6 Marked by coverage in mass-media. A typical example of that kind of spectacular, shocking and pessimistic
thinking is an article in the German magazine Stern (1996) on globalisation: ‘Ein STERN-Report über die
unberechenbaren Folgen der Globalisierung’. The large headlines decorating several pages of the article were
very explicit and legitimized by the fact that they were quotations from opinion-leaders  are telling: ‘Kein job is
mehr sicher. Irgend jemand, irgendwo auf dieser Welt kann eure Arbeitsplätze kaputtmachen’ (Rosabeth Moss
Kanter, Ekonomieprofessor) ‘Es wird bald keine nationalen Produkte, Unternehmen und Industrien mehr geben.
Es ist das Ende der Volkswirtschaften’ (Robert Reich), ‘Wir laufen auf eine Kapitalismus ohne Arbeit zu
(Ulrich Bech, socioloog), ‘Wir sind schlanker, aber auch gemeiner geworden’ (New York Times) and ‘Der
Hammer des Globalismus schlägt auf die zurück, die ihn erfunden haben; auf ihren Reichtum, ihren Sozialstaat’
(Wilhelm Hankel, economist). Auch bei uns wird es Slums geben. In: Stern, july 18
th 1996, pp.22-32
7 Which can be labelled - with a serious amount of relativization and nuance - as a neo-corporatist system or the
continental Rhenish model (model Rhénal), based on the principles of the Fordist regulation. More information
on the difference between the Rhenish and the neo-American model is to be found in the first-rate book of
Michel Albert (1991).
8 The ‘twin forces of regionalism and globalisation’ (Dent 1996).
9 It is not possible here, neither is it my intention, to refute nor to examine this convention which has, by
definition, its opponents. The figures on trade and foreign investment are well known to most professionals and
it is needless to repeat them. On the basis of these data, Wyatt-Walter concludes that flows of FDI have
enhanced inter-regional more than intra-regional linkages in the world economy, which is somewhat at odds
with the regionalization hypothesis. After all, as so much recent managment-studies literature has suggested,
companies competing in global markets were increasingly likely to establish a local precense in the three main
markets of the ‘triad’ during the 1980s.
10 Of all companies, MNO are the ones of which one can expect to be the most global minded and active, MNO
are perceived to be the global players par excellence as if they reach the maximum degree of globalisation
possible for an individual enterprise. Therefore, it is interesting to know how global these players really are.
11 In their article, Keller and Pauly indicate that, in contrast to common perception, intensifying cutthroat
competition makes enduring national differences in the rules of the game more obvious, not less.
12 The global character of MNO was examined thoroughly in the fascinating study of Ruigrok and van Tulder
(1995), in which they draw a full and critical picture on the global aspect of MNO.
13 Which refers to 1) the contested restructuring of the institurional level from the national scale both upwards
to supra-national and/or global scales and downwards to the scale of the individual body, the local, the urban or
regional configurations and 2) the strategies of global localisation of key forms of industrial, service and
finance capital.
14 It is rather striking, and yet we are used to it, that many authors write about economic competition in terms of
warfare. As if competition was something like a battle between enemys, as if one must respond to acts of the
adversary with ‘massive retaliation’, as if each territory (on the world market) captured by one region wasnecessarily at the expense of an other region and must therefore be avoided, as if weakening the others
strengthens the own position.
15 In the words of President Clinton, each nation is like a big corporation, competing in the global marketplace,
a view that became pervasive among opinion leaders throughout the world. If regions share a part of location-
decisive regulation, one can replace ‘nation’ by ‘region’.
16 According to popular belief, these costs (of production) are a very - probably the most - decisive factor in the
consideration investors make before locating an economic activity in that area. It is believed that entrepreneurs
select a production-site mainly on the basis of the cost of production. Since labour is relatively immobile, thus
location-specific, and other factors (such as technology and capital) are available worldwide, it is believed that
the price of labour will be decisive for the decision on the location of economic activities.
17 In the words of Swyngedouw, “it remains deeply disturbing to find the power of money and a homogenizing
imperialist culture take control of ever larger scales, while very often the ‘politics of resistance’ seem to revel
in some sort of ‘militant particularism’ in which local loyalties, identity politics and celebrating the unique self
from the different Others attest to the impotence to embrace an emancipatory and empowering politics of
scale.” Swyngedouw (1996:21)
18 Of course, regions are strictly speaking not what we usually mean when we use the word states - for the time
being this denomination seems to be the privilege of the national scale - and it would give evidence of an
excessive abstraction to do so. I only intend that (several) regions assumed some competences typically for
‘states’ (e.g. legislation, representation, taxation, etc.) and can therefore be understood as ‘statelike actors’,
especially in the context of factors exerting influence on production costs.
19 In short, these strategies come down to states wishing to join togehter in large regional blocs, adopt the
‘developmental state model’, embrace the ‘social democratic’ mode of selective integration into the world
economy, seek to dominate their regional economy or even the world economy to achieve hegemony. Poorer
and weaker states are likely to opt for one of the following strategies: try to exploit their cheap and abundant
labour to attract foreing capital, seek to exploit a parasitical niche in the world market such as tax havens or
they may be structurally impeded from joining the competitive game at all (which is hardly an ‘option’).
20 The competition state is an ‘ideal-type’ description of activities of the state based upon four essential
assumptions: that governments are concerned primarly with economic growth and that they are willing and
likely to undertake measures to improve the standard of living and growth in their territories; that the place,
ownership and type of production facilities are a matter of profound concern for political authorities, that
multinational enterprises seek global presence, possible by enhanced mobility; and that the source of economic
growth lies in encouraging economic actors to invest.
21 According to Palan, Abbott, and Deans (1996), this state is based on the fusing of ‘public’ and ‘private’, the
role of state ideology, the use of developmental legitimacy, plan rationality and the existence of a relatively
autonomous economic technocracy.
22 Strange pointed out the issue of the growing importance of ‘firm-firm’ and ‘state-firm’ diplomacy, next to the
classic ‘state-state’ diplomacy.
23 Some of which are explicitly the competence of the regional ‘competition state’.
24 Indeed an elusive and vague concept, since there is little agreement about the nature of Fordism and post/neo-
Fordism in general or the trajectories wich might link them.
25 Jessop sees four changes that created pressures for the development of this new state form: the rise of new
technologies, growing internationalisation, the paradigm shift from Fordism to post-Fordism and the
regionalisation of global and national economies. Given the growing competitive pressures from N.I.C.’s on
low-cost, low-tech production and in simple high-tech products, the advanced capitalist economies must mve up
the technological hierarchy and specialise in the new core technologies if they are to maintain employment and
growth. Hence, the importance of R&D, education, skills and knowledge, infrastructure, personal stimulation
and career-building, ... for which state action is required. States must shift industrial support away from efforts
to mainain declining sectors and towards promoting new sectors.
26 The wage relation should be recomposed with a polarisation between skilled and unskilled workers, there
would be a greater emphasis on (functional, numerical) flexibility in internal and external labour markets, a
shift would occur towards enterprise- or plant-level collective bargaining (down scaling), ... in short the
enterprise system could see a shift towards flatter, leaner and more flexible forms of organisation.
27 In other words, the end of Keynes and his demand-side policy, of full employment and deficit spending, of
redistributive welfare rights ... A symbolic illustration was the failure of Mitterands first term as president, a
clear support for those claiming the impossibility of Keynes and Ford in recent history.28 Down scaling of social regulation, towards the individual: workfare. Several authors indicate the revaluation
of personal contribution in and thus responsibility for failure and success, the demassification, individualization
of solidarity. This is what workfare is about: the evolution from compensation towards activation in order to
prevent a ‘culture of dependency’ (Murray 1984). An important stimulation for the intellectual and political
debate in Europe was the publication of Pierre Rosanvallon’s ‘La nouvelle question sociale. Repenser l’Etat-
providence ’ (1995). The ‘transition from passive measures to active measures’ is well illustrated by the
conclusions of the European Council of november 20-21, 1997, held in Luxemburg: “benefit and training
systems (where that proves necessary) must be reviewed and adapted to ensure that they actively support
employability and provide real incentives for the unemployed to seek and take up work or training
opportunities. Each Member State will endeavour to increase significantly the number of persons benefitting
from active measures to improve their employability.” (Conclusions of the presidency, 1997: 53-54).
29 The class compromise, supporting the KWS, reflected the belief that Fordist mass production was supply-
driven and could only be profitable when high levels of demand were maintained. Since globalisation, some
believe that the world is the market and that the success of national business world is no longer dependent on
the national demand.
30 In their working paper, Slaughter and Swagel do leave some rome for globalisation to play a role: “on the
other hand, increased globalization can exacerbate the effect of preexisting economic problems, such as the
phenomenon in which the combination of wage rigidity and capital mobility in Europe magnifies the impact of
external shocks on unemployment.” (p.25)
31 Interview with Dani Rodrik. In: Challenge (1998: 83). Singh and Zammit (1995:103) go even further since
they write that in view of the complexity of the subject, there is no agreement in the literature on the
appropriate theoretical or empirical models for analysing the impact of Third World competition on
manufacturing output and employment in the North.
32 A fear which several surveys illustrate daily. In these opinion polls, people give evidence of the fact that they
are apprehensive for the future, or at least afraid of competition with low wage countries (social dumping)
causing unemployment or decrease of wages.
33 E.g., the total movement of capital to newly industrializing countries in 1993 was roughly $100 billion which
means that less 2.5 percent of the investment of the First World actually flowed south
34 Which makes it at least defensible to suggest a trend towards higher interdependence or globalisation.
35 So, there is a considerable variation. The difference between the highest and lowest cost regions is some 4 or
5 to 1. In between these extremes, most regions in Italy, France, the Netherlands and Belgium, as well as
Luxembourg, have hourly labour costs between 15 and 20 ECU, while in Ireland, the UK, Spain and the former
East Germany, costs are, in most cases, between 10 and 15 ECU an hour. But, more importantly, these
interregional differences reflect, in some degree, variations in the structure of industrial activity as between
regions, the low cost areas tending to have a larger share of employment in more basic industries than the
higher cost ones. These variations will tend, in turn, to be reflected in labour productivity.
36 In which relocation is clearly based on the mechanism of social dumping.
37 An extensive study of the Belgian Planbureau on the ‘delocation of companies’, made clear that in the case
of a collective company shut-down (and a reopening in a new, foreign location), the majority of these
companies moved to neighbouring countries. Other methods of approach, e.g. the analysis of the pattern of
outsourcing and contracting-out, confirmed this conclusion. This study had a great part in demystifying the
subject since it explained that only a small part of delocation of Belgian enterprises towards foreign production
sites had to with considerations on the (in)direct wages and social regulation as elements of the production
costs. In most cases, other reflections were dominant. (Planbureau, Bernard, Van Sebroeck, Spinnewyn, Gilot
and Vandenhove 1994)
38 The concept ‘globalisation’ is not suitable as a descriptive category, its contribution lies somewhere else.
39 This titel refers to Gaus (1979).
40 Furthermore, according to Ross and Trachte (1990), the registration of FDI, trade, etc. does not even capture
comprehensively the relocation of manufacturing to the periphery by core capital.
41 We all acknowledge that ‘yesterday’ manifests itself ‘today’, but accepting the statement that ‘tomorrow’, a
vague and uncertain expectation, does the same seems more problematic.
42 And that is what it is all about in social science: the explanation of behaviour, not the consideration if people
do live in conformance with the scientific wisdom.
43 As a result, more often than not, people do what is expected of them.44 In most cases deprived of a critical reflection and engaged in unconscious ‘group think’. And in the era of
‘pensée unique’, the majority of leaders and mass seem to share the same thoughts and ideals.
45 In indicates that the subject’s view of his situation, how he regards it, may be the most important element of
interpretation since his immediate behaviour is closely related to that definition, which may be in terms of
objective reality or in terms of subjective appreciation. Only close attention to the subjective ways in which
human beings filter the crude data of their senses and construct ‘facts’, only sustained concern with the
mediating functions of the human mind can help to explain the fact that different individuals, confronted with
an identical stimulus, react to it in utterly different ways.
46 Because this is the common perception and conventional wisdom proclaimed by opinion leaders (such as
members of government and parliament, scientists, political parties, news papers, union leaders, CEO’s) in that
society.
47 E.g., the king has power, even when he sleeps.
48 However, for this anticipatory reaction to take place, they must know or believe that someone actually
posseses the relevant resources and that there is a reasonable probability of his using them to wield power
should their own (in)actions fail to accord with what they take to be his wishes. By the way, Wrong prefers the
term ‘latent’ rather than ‘potential’ to indicate the double sense of power as a dispositional concept because
‘latent’ suggests the covert presence of something actually affecting a situation in contrast to the weaker
implication of ‘potential’ that something may assert its presence under purely hypothetical or counter-factual
conditions.
49 So the consciousness of the power subject is a crucial consideration in imputations of power on the basis of
anticipated reactions.
50 Which are, of course, not to be underestimated and which are well documented
51 One can ask if  the nation state ever reached a full sovereignity over its territory.
52 Indeed, there are a lot of resemblances with previous periods, e.g. pre-1913 period, but recurrence is not the
same as blind reproduction. Although processes can be driven by the same logic, law, pronciple or whatever,
they can have very different consequences in a different spatial-temporal locus.
53 Not only in the sense of regionalism, nationalism, devolution (structure) and so on, but also refering to the
functions (role) of the state and its place (position) in contemporary society. Introducing concepts as ‘non-state
actors’ will be insufficient, since it implies that states are dominant and other actors are secondary (Willetts
1997).
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